ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Through the recent years, we can see a more and more growing convergence of communication networks and ICT (Information and Communication Technology) in general, but also especially in the domain of electric power systems. On one hand this leads to new opportunities, to more flexibility, to cost savings (applying standards and standardized technologies), reduced technical complexity, and reduced vendor dependency. In this sense IP technology (Internet Protocol) and Ethernet more and more play major roles. We therefore specially focus on the aspects of IP and Ethernet technology throughout this paper. Considering information security in convergent networks, IP and Ethernet are automatically involved in communication network design and operation. All Ethernet and IP capable devices inside the network are affected also. (E.g. servers and clients, routers, firewalls, switches, modems, media converters, etc.) By this development, new classes of challenges and threats are introduced to information-and communication systems for power systems. Appropriate methods to deal with this new, rapidly changing, and evolving security situation must be found. Even more important, these must be incorporated and implemented in the organization of power companies, whether this is power generation, transmission, distribution, trading, etc. The aim of this paper is to raise awareness of new threats, which automatically arise with technical improvements and usage of standardized technologies. We also show on practical examples what reality is like, and how one can face the challenges. We give hints and show references in order to establish best practice processes and (counter-) measures to strengthen telecommunication and control networks for power systems.
M, E and I domains in power system companies
Communication and management processes inside a power company are essential and sometimes also safety critical. There is a certain chance of misunderstanding, since the targets and the terminology of information security is used ambiguously. From our practical experience we generally perceive at least three points of view concerning the topic of information security. We introduce three generic (logical) domains, which should reflect the organizational structures of many power companies:
• Management: M domain; It gives general directives and sets a company's policy and rules. In last consequence it is responsible for all actions carried out (or not being carried out).
• Energy, technical: E domain; the operational domain of running the production, the transmission, the distribution, and all other core businesses of the power company. Here are the technical "Energy" people.
• Information, technical: I domain; this comprises the people and procedures to acquire, transmit and process the data and information needed by the E domain to actually run the business for M. For a practical approach we suggest, that a risk analysis is made on the communication flows and processes inside the company. The result is an overview of how the above mentioned three domains are developed, how they are staffed, which experience is available, and how they interact.
Regarding the information security of a substation under investigation this means:
E needs to analyze the requirements concerning the business relevance of that network segment, the customers behind the station, the automation grade of the station, the equipment inside the station, the communication facilities, and the communication lines running to there. See Figure 1 and Not only data and information will be exchanged between E and I, it is also a must to exchange metadata in terms of describing the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) criteria of that data and information, especially in the perspective of the business needs of M. It can be symbolized like this: I is the postman; E is the sender and receiver. If E sends a letter and says to I: "Ship it!". It can be done in different ways: Normal, Express, Registered, with delivery confirmation, … . The postman will probably do it the cheapest way if he does not get guidelines on how to do it exactly. The sender does not necessarily know all the possibilities of the postman. Here is a potential problem if there is insufficient communication between the parties. Reality reflects this problem: If E does not specify how to treat the data (or does not know the possibilities), I will potentially do it the cheapest way, spoiling security or endangering the whole business process. Setting up an Information Security Management System (ISMS) including risk management (e.g. following [1] ) is an appropriate approach. It is not obligatory to do a certification!
How substation security can be affected
Through improper collaboration between E and I and through not understanding each other, risks may arise. Exemplary bloopers often found in practice:
• E representative sees nice ICT features on a fair or product show (e.g.: GPRS/UMTS or WLAN is "hip" nowadays, easy, cheap, and convenient…) but I's concerns and strategies, known risks, best practices, etc. are neglected, poorly covered or even worse, not covered at all.
• Risks with wireless technologies are underestimated e.g.: no deterministic latency behavior, availability, stability (congested base stations drop data), varying bandwidth, etc.
• New substation is built and ready to go: "Where is the to deal with problems which arise after or through applying a patch/update; Use test beds and test systems. Requirements for different information and security domains come from the risk management.
• Substation vendor ships ICT bundled with electrical plant components as a "Turn-Key Solution" making it difficult to integrate it into the power company's infrastructure or apply homogenous policies.
• "ICT islands" are or were built, but need to be interconnected making it a tricky and insecure solution.
ICT technology perception
E often has a simplified point of view of I's technology ("I can use the internet to control my plants"). E's technology lifecycles are approximately ten times longer than I's. In the recent past, proprietary systems, grown through time, were and still are in use in many power companies. This situation is now changing, thus needing to catch up know how and state of the art in the I domain. Confidence into the system manufacturer/vendor that all necessary measures were taken regarding IT security doesn't disburden from a responsible information security management.
Examples for critical ICT technologies and practices inside a substation: Radio and wireless technologies; Data over the Internet; Data over carrier networks not owned by the utility itself; "Consumer Grade" components; System manufacturer or vendor doesn't see whole picture; power network operator may be overstrained with IT security topics. Technologies developed for E have been taken over by the rapid development in I's domain. (lifecycles are shorter, market size is bigger) I technology (consumer Technology) has advantages and disadvantages: Development is much more evolved [10] , but introduces new risks, which need to be properly addressed.
Drivers for the roles
The three main roles of the domains E, I, and M usually do not have the same direct objectives. The management has to assure financial issues as well as legal compliances. Further responsibilities include high level risk management, company policy conformity, and strategic focus. With these issues in mind, the management pays attention to the health of the company. People in the E and I domains have slightly different perspectives to the system. Typically, staff members of the E domain want to monitor and control the power grid status, and are trying to establish cheap and efficient operational processes. Their colleagues in the I domain are responsible for data transmission of the required information including necessary data encryption, providing data integrity, and authentication mechanisms. To ensure overall quality and security, the persons at a specific domain have to keep in mind the perceptions and drivers of the other two domains (see Figure 3 ). This requires a tight communication culture at the interfaces between the domains.
TARGET, DESIRABLE SITUATION
Ideally, risk management starts from the business processes and business perspectives of the company. Target is to enable good communication between E and I under common goals, where M sets the policies. See Figure 2 . For realization and implementation of structured information security there are already existing solutions, best practices and guidelines. Observe e.g. [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] Responsibility needs to be taken and some work has to be done. There is a wide choice of standards in the field of information security. See e.g. 
CONCLUSIONS
Don't neglect the issue of information security. It is not necessary to implement one of the listed standards in your organization or do a certification, but follow the guidelines. A healthy information flow between the involved parties will help you in setting up more secure, reliable and still efficient information infrastructures to protect all your facilities and processes. Then, the exemplary substation of this paper will definitely benefit in preventing a hacker attack or intrusion.
